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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
This case presents the question whether the District 
Court abused its discretion when it certified an “issue class” 
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. We hold that it did. According to Rule 23(c)(4), “[w]hen 
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues.” For “an action” to be 
“brought or maintained as a class action,” the party seeking 
class status must satisfy Rule 23 and all its requirements. Com-
cast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). Further, in 
Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011), we 
enumerated a “non-exclusive list of factors” relevant to as-
sessing whether the certification of an issue class under Rule 
23(c)(4) is “appropriate.” Id. at 272 (quoting Chiang v. Vene-
man, 385 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2004)).  So when a party seeks 
to certify “particular issues” for class treatment, the district 
court must ask three questions. First, does the proposed issue 
class satisfy Rule 23(a)’s requirements? Second, does the pro-
posed issue class fit within one of Rule 23(b)’s categories? 
Third, if it does, is it “appropriate” to certify this as an issue 
class? Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Here, lacking clear guidance, 
the District Court failed to determine whether the issues iden-
tified for class treatment fit within one of Rule 23(b)’s catego-
ries and then failed to explicitly consider a few of the Gates 
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factors. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we will va-
cate the District Court’s issue-class certification and remand 
for further proceedings.  
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Educational Commission for Foreign Medi-
cal Graduates 
Graduates of foreign medical schools who wish to be 
accepted to a United States medical-residency program must 
have graduated from a recognized foreign institution, demon-
strated English-language proficiency, and passed the first two 
steps of the United States Medical Licensing Examination.  
Defendant-Appellant Educational Commission for Foreign 
Medical Graduates (“the Commission”) is a Philadelphia-
based nonprofit that certifies that such graduates have satisfied 
those requirements.  The Commission carries out this function 
in two ways. First, it administers the English-language and 
medical examinations the foreign medical school graduates 
must pass.  Second, the Commission verifies, using primary 
sources, that the applicant received a medical degree from a 
qualifying institution.  
As the central certification agency for graduates of for-
eign medical schools, the Commission also investigates what 
it calls “irregular behavior.”  According to internal policies, the 
Commission may investigate “all actions or attempted actions 
on the part of applicants . . . that would or could subvert the 
examination, certification or other processes, programs, or ser-
vices of [the Commission].” J.A. 254. The Commission’s in-
vestigation of such behavior proceeds as follows. When the 
Commission receives an allegation that an applicant commit-
ted irregular behavior, it reviews the allegation and determines 
whether sufficient evidence supports the charge. If sufficient 
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evidence supports the charge, the Commission notifies the ap-
plicant of the allegation and invites him to submit a written ex-
planation or present any other relevant information. The appli-
cant may also request a hearing and hire legal counsel. After 
the applicant is heard, the Commission then determines 
whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicant en-
gaged in the irregular behavior that was charged. The Commis-
sion may take various disciplinary actions, up to and including 
permanent revocation of a certification. The charged individual 
has a right of appeal, but petitions to reconsider decisions are 
granted “only in extraordinary cases.” Id. And whatever the 
case, if the Commission “determines that an individual en-
gaged in irregular behavior, a permanent annotation to that ef-
fect will be included in the individual’s [Commission] record.” 
Id. 
 
B. A Foreign Doctor Named Charles Igberase 
In early 1992, a man named Oluwafemi Charles Ig-
berase applied to the Commission for certification. He eventu-
ally passed the medical-licensing and English-language exam-
inations and was issued the Commission’s certification. But no 
residency program accepted him. So, in March 1994, Igberase 
submitted a second application for certification to the Commis-
sion. In that application, however, Igberase rearranged his 
name (“Igberase Oluwafemi Charles” instead of “Oluwafemi 
Charles Igberase”); used a different date of birth (April 17, 
1961 instead of April 17, 1962); and responded “No” to the 
question of whether he had ever previously submitted an appli-
cation to the Commission. Igberase passed each required ex-
amination and was certified by the Commission for a second 
time. But in June 1995, the Commission learned that Igberase 
had obtained two of its certifications under different names and 
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dates of birth, and had lied on his second application about not 
seeking certification previously. So it invalidated Igberase’s 
second certification and revoked the first, and informed the 
United States Medical Licensing Examination Committee of 
his deception. J.A. 237. 
In 1996, Igberase applied to the Commission for certifi-
cation for yet a third time. In this application, Igberase ditched 
his first two names and invented another one: “John Nosa 
Akoda.” J.A. 263. As he had twice before, Igberase (as Akoda) 
eventually passed the medical-licensing and English-language 
examinations and received the Commission’s certification.  
After receiving the certification as “Akoda,” Igberase applied 
for and was admitted to a residency program in New Jersey. 
But in August 2000, the residency program learned that the so-
cial security number Akoda used in his application belonged to 
Igberase. The residency program informed the Commission of 
the inconsistency, provisionally suspended the doctor it knew 
as Akoda, and, after an internal investigation, in November 
2000, dismissed him.  
Once it learned of Akoda’s possible misuse of Ig-
berase’s social security number, the Commission launched its 
own investigation. Based on the information it had received 
from the residency program, the Commission sent Akoda a 
“charge letter.” In it, the Commission told Akoda that it had 
“received information alleging that you may have engaged in 
irregular behavior,” specifically that he had twice before ap-
plied for certification using the name “Igberase.” J.A. 284. The 
Commission told Akoda that the allegations “require[] an ex-
planation,” and granted him fifteen days to submit a written 
response. J.A. 285. 
A week later, as Akoda, Igberase responded. He denied 
the allegations, telling the Commission that “[t]he identifica-
tion numbers listed in your letter apparently belong to my 
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cousin Dr. Igberase Oluwafemi Charles, who left the country 
to practice, I believe, in South Africa.” J.A. 287. Akoda admit-
ted using Igberase’s social security number but insisted that 
they were “two different persons who attended two different 
Colleges of Medicine.” Id. He reiterated that he had “only 
taken the examination once in my name, John NOSA Akoda,” 
and offered to provide the Commission with his passport if it 
requested it. J.A. 287.  
The Commission official overseeing Akoda’s case ap-
parently did not buy the explanation. In a December 2000 
memorandum intentionally not made part of Akoda’s official 
file, the official wrote that he and others believed Igberase and 
Akoda were one in the same. J.A. 293. But the official con-
cluded that he did not have enough evidence to recommend 
Akoda’s case to the Commission’s credentialling committee. 
So Akoda’s credential remained active.  
In October 2006, Igberase, again as “Akoda,” applied to 
a residency program at Howard University Medical Center. As 
part of his application, he submitted to the Commission three 
letters of recommendation. But the Commission was suspi-
cious of Akoda, so one of its officials attempted to verify the 
authenticity of these three letters of reference.  The official sent 
each reference the recommendation letter submitted by Akoda 
and asked each whether the letter was authentic. The record 
does not reflect whether the official received a response from 
any of the references. 
Despite the official’s reservations, Igberase (as Akoda) 
was admitted to Howard’s residency program.  He successfully 
completed the program in 2011. After completing the program, 
he applied for and received a Maryland medical license using 
fake identification documents. That same year, he became a 
member of the medical staff at Prince George’s Hospital Cen-
ter and began seeing patients there.   
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In June 2016, law enforcement officials executed search 
warrants at Igberase’s residence, medical office, and vehicle. 
They found fraudulent or altered immigration documents, 
medical diplomas, medical transcripts, letters of recommenda-
tion, and birth certificates. On November 15, 2016, Igberase 
signed a plea agreement. In it, he pleaded guilty to misuse of a 
social security account number to fraudulently obtain a Mary-
land medical license and admitted that “Akoda” was a pseudo-
nym. Id.  
The Commission subsequently invalidated Akoda’s for-
eign-doctor certification, and the Maryland Board of Physi-
cians revoked his medical license.  
 
C. Patients of Igberase sue the Commission 
The named Plaintiffs are Monique Russell, Jasmine 
Riggins, Elsa Powell, and Desire Evans. Each received medical 
treatment from the doctor known as “Akoda,” who was certi-
fied by the Commission in 1997. Igberase performed un-
planned emergency cesarean-section surgery on Russell and 
Riggins and delivered Evans’s and Powell’s children. These 
Plaintiffs also seek to represent a class of similarly situated in-
dividuals who likewise received medical treatment from 
“Akoda.” But the Plaintiffs (appellees here) did not sue Ig-
berase. Instead, they sued the Commission, and asserted claims 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the 
Commission’s certification of Igberase as “Akoda.” 
Eventually, the district court certified a class of “All pa-
tients examined or treated in any manner by Oluwafemi 
Charles Igberase (a/ka [sic] Charles J. Akoda) beginning with 
his enrollment in a postgraduate medical education program at 
Howard University in 2007.” J.A. 63-64. But the district court 
did not certify the class under any subsection of Rule 23(b). 
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Instead, the court certified the class as an “issue class” pursuant 
to Rule 23(c)(4). The court certified the class with respect to 
these issues:  
(1) whether the Commission undertook or otherwise 
owed a duty to class members.  
(2) whether the Commission breached any duty that 
it owed to class members.  
(3) whether the Commission undertook or otherwise 
owed a duty to hospitals and state medical boards, 
such that it may be held liable to class members pur-
suant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A.  
(4) whether the defendant breached any duty that it 
owed to hospitals and state medical boards.  
In short, the particular issues the district court certified 
for class treatment concern only the duty and breach elements 
of Plaintiffs’ claim. The district court therefore left for individ-
ualized proceedings whether each Plaintiff was injured; 
whether the Commission’s breach of the relevant duty (if it had 
a duty that was breached) actually and proximately caused 
those injuries; whether those injuries are due a particular 
amount of damages; and whether the Commission could raise 
any affirmative defense, including, presumably, whether each 
Plaintiff’s consent to medical treatment by Igberase breaks the 
causal chain. In the wake of the Rule 23(c)(4) certification, the 
Commission successfully petitioned for leave to appeal under 





II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ISSUE-CLASS CERTIFICA-
TION 
A. Rule 23 outlines one procedure for pursuing ag-
gregate litigation 
The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of 
Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)). One reason the class 
action is an exceptional form of litigation is because final judg-
ments in such actions may implicate the procedural and sub-
stantive rights of absent persons. 
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the principle that 
absent persons may not be bound by federal-court judgments 
unless one of a limited number of historically recognized ex-
ceptions is satisfied. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 
(2008). A “properly conducted” class action is one such excep-
tion. Id. at 894-95. A properly conducted class action requires 
that (1) “[t]he interests of the nonparty and her representative 
are aligned”; (2) “either the party understood herself to be act-
ing in a representative capacity or the original court took care 
to protect the interests of the nonparty”; and (3) there was “no-
tice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been rep-
resented.” Id. at 900.  
In the class context, “these limitations are implemented 
by the procedural safeguards in Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23.” Id. at 900-01. The procedural safeguards of Rule 23, 
in turn, are constitutionally mandated and “grounded in due 
process.” Id. at 901. Rule 23 thus provides a constitutional safe 
harbor for litigants to pursue class treatment on behalf of ab-
sent persons. But the party seeking to certify a class “bears the 
burden of affirmatively demonstrating by a preponderance of 
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the evidence her compliance with the requirements of Rule 
23.” Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); 
see also Reyes v. Netdeposit, LLC, 802 F.3d 469, 485 (3d Cir. 
2015) (discussing and clarifying preponderance of evidence 
standard in class certification determinations).  
The requirements of Rule 23 are these. The party seek-
ing class certification must demonstrate, first, that the require-
ments of Rule 23(a) are met. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). To satisfy Rule 23(a), a plaintiff 
must “prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, 
common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or de-
fenses, and adequacy of representation.” Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Once beyond Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites, plaintiffs 
then must seek to certify a class of one of three “types,” each 
with additional requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). For 
instance, Rule 23(b)(3), a provision at issue here, states that a 
class may be maintained where “questions of law or fact com-
mon to class members predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members,” and a class action would be “su-
perior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently ad-
judicating the controversy.”1 
 
1 There are two additional “types” of class actions maintainable 
under Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(1) allows a class to be maintained 
where “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual 
class members would create a risk of” either “(A) inconsistent 
or varying adjudications,” or “(B) adjudications . . . that, as a 
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the 
other members not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests.” Rule 23(b)(2), by contrast, applies when “the 
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Rule 23(c) provides two additional pathways to a form 
of class certification. Rule 23(c)(5) permits a district court, 
“[w]hen appropriate,” to “divide[]” a class “into subclasses that 
are each treated as a class under [Rule 23].” So if a district court 
detects dissimilarities of interests between the putative class 
representative and absent class members, it may divide the full 
class into subclasses to isolate atypical issues or claims, or re-
solve conflicts of interest that otherwise would preclude full 
class certification. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Football League Play-
ers Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 432 (3d Cir. 2016); 
see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) 
(“[A] class divided between holders of present and future 
claims . . . requires division into homogenous subclasses . . . 
with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests 
of counsel.”). And Rule 23(c)(4), the provision center stage 
here, states that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought 
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular is-
sues.” Pursuant to that provision, we have previously held that 
a district court may certify for class treatment issues that 
would, upon their resolution, determine a defendant’s course 
of conduct. See Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 
2004). In what follows, we examine the scope of issue-class 
certification under Rule 23(c)(4).  
 
 
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief 
or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole.” 
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B. Issue-class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) 
grants district courts broad but well-defined dis-
cretion to certify particular issues for class treat-
ment 
Let us restate the text of Rule 23(c)(4). It says that 
“[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained 
as a class action with respect to particular issues.” The Rule, 
therefore, permits an issue class to be brought or maintained 
“as a class action.” But with that permission comes restrictions. 
To be a “class action,” a party must satisfy Rule 23 and all its 
requirements. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 
(2013); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Lit., 552 F.3d 305, 
310 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] class may not be certified without a 
finding that each Rule 23 requirement is met.”). In other words, 
“[i]n addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, parties 
seeking class certification must show that the action is main-
tainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” Amchem Prods., Inc. 
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). A party seeking to cer-
tify “particular issues” for class treatment must show the same. 
That party must show that those issues “satisfy[] Rule 23(a)’s 
prerequisites” and that those issues are “maintainable under 
Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” See id.   
But neither Rule 23(c)(4) nor its commentary outlines 
the “appropriate[ness]” inquiry, or discusses which types of 
“issues” might be suitable for class treatment and which may 
not be. At the provision’s adoption, the Rules Committee, in 
its commentary, suggested that the issue-class device may be 
used to bifurcate the “adjudication of liability to the class” from 
follow-on proceedings needed to “prove the amounts of [class 
members’] respective claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) advi-
sory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. That commentary 
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does not illuminate much. In a typical Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tion, for example, individualized damages determinations of-
ten remain after common questions have been decided. See, 
e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 452-60 
(2016); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 
455, 465-70 (2013). Further, Rule 23(c)(4) talks about “is-
sues,” not “liability” (or “claims” or “causes of action”), so 
there is no obvious textual basis to limit issue-class certifica-
tion to issues that, upon their resolution, necessarily establish 
a defendant’s liability as to all claimants. 
We explained Rule 23(c)(4)’s “appropriate[ness]” in-
quiry in Gates v. Rohm & Haas, 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011). 
In Gates, we considered the appropriateness of issue-class cer-
tification for property owners who alleged that a chemical 
company’s pollution decreased their property values. In 2005, 
Rohm & Haas acquired a chemical-processing plant in Ring-
wood, Illinois. Id. at 258. For the half-century or so prior to 
Rohm & Haas’s acquisition, the Ringwood facility was owned 
and operated by a company called Morton International. Id. 
During at least some of that time, Morton dumped wastewater 
produced by its chemical processing into an on-site lagoon. Id. 
The wastewater contained vinylidene chloride, a molecule 
used in the production of vinyl chloride, which is important in 
the production of plastics and a known carcinogen. “In 1978, 
Morton ceased using the on-site lagoon and covered it.” Id. But 
environmental testing in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that 
Morton’s dumping of vinylidene chloride was polluting the 
surrounding environment. In 1973, for example, “tests of a 
shallow aquifer under the Ringwood facility showed elevated 
levels of ammonia and chloride.” Id. And in 1984, water sam-
ples from wells that Morton had installed at Ringwood showed 
elevated levels of vinylidene chloride and vinyl chloride. Id. 
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In 2006, residents of a nearby residential village filed a 
class-action complaint alleging, among other things, that Mor-
ton’s dumping of the vinylidene chloride caused their residen-
tial community to become less attractive and their property val-
ues to decrease.2 Id. at 259, 271. Before the district court, with 
respect to their property damage claim, the plaintiffs moved to 
certify two classes—a Rule 23(b)(3) class of property owners 
who allegedly suffered loss in property values due to the de-
fendants’ contamination and an “issue only” class that would 
decide defendants’ liability but leave damages for individual 
trials. Id. at 272. 
The district court declined to certify either class. As to 
the plaintiffs’ proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class, the district court 
found that common questions did not predominate over indi-
vidual ones. The court observed “that resolution of [common] 
questions leaves significant and complex questions unan-
swered, including questions relating to causation of contami-
nation, extent of contamination, fact of damages, and amount 
of damages.” Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., 265 F.R.D. 208, 
233-34 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The district court likewise rejected 
plaintiffs’ attempt to certify a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class. The 
 
2 The plaintiffs’ complaint asserted several claims for relief, 
including medical monitoring, property damage claims, relief 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., 
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
§ 5/1 et seq., and state-law fraudulent misrepresentation and 
willful and wanton misconduct claims. But they chose to pro-
ceed on a class basis only on the medical monitoring and prop-
erty damage claims and, as noted, solely with regard to vinyl 
chloride exposure. Gates, 655 F.3d at 259. 
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court found that an issue class “would not advance the resolu-
tion of class members’ claims” because, like in the Rule 
23(b)(3) context, “the fact of damages and the amount of dam-
ages would remain following the class-wide determination of 
any common issues, and further that causation and extent of 
contamination would need to be determined at follow-up pro-
ceedings.” Gates, 655 F.3d at 272 (quotation marks omitted). 
We affirmed. 
In affirming the district court’s decision not to certify a 
Rule 23(c)(4) issue class, we adopted a “non-exclusive list of 
factors [to] guide courts” faced with motions to certify partic-
ular issues. Gates, 655 F.3d at 273. Id. The factors, which num-
ber nine, are these:  
 
1. the type of claim(s) and issue(s) in question;  
2. the overall complexity of the case;  
3. the efficiencies to be gained by granting partial cer-
tification in light of realistic procedural alternatives; 
4. the substantive law underlying the claim(s), includ-
ing any choice-of-law questions it may present and 
whether the substantive law separates the issue(s) 
from other issues concerning liability or remedy;  
5. the impact partial certification will have on the con-
stitutional and statutory rights of both the class 
members and the defendant(s);  
6. the potential preclusive effect or lack thereof that 
resolution of the proposed issue class will have;  
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7. the repercussions certification of an issue(s) class 
will have on the effectiveness and fairness of reso-
lution of remaining issues;  
8. the impact individual proceedings may have upon 
one another, including whether remedies are indi-
visible such that granting or not granting relief to 
any claimant as a practical matter determines the 
claims of others;  
9. and the kind of evidence presented on the issue(s) 
certified and potentially presented on the remaining 
issues, including the risk subsequent triers of fact 
will need to reexamine evidence and findings from 
resolution of the common issue(s). 
When assembled, the Gates factors construct a func-
tional framework to aid the district courts tasked with resolving 
issue-class certification questions.3 But Gates did not define 
which “issues” would be appropriate for class treatment or, 
 
3 The Gates factors grew out of our opinion in Hohider v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2009). In 
Hohider, we provided relevant considerations on when a dis-
trict court may wish “to carve at the joints to form issue clas-
ses.” Gates, 655 F.3d at 273. As source for the factors, the 
Hohider court cited the American Law Institute’s “Proposed 
Final Draft of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litiga-
tion.” Hohider, 574 F.3d at 200-02. By the time Gates issued, 
the ALI had finalized the Principles, and we incorporated many 
of them as the factors district courts should consider in as-




more importantly, which would not. Specifically, Gates did not 
answer whether the term “particular issues” in Rule 23(c)(4) 
could encompass claim elements (like duty or breach, or cau-
sation or reliance) and defenses (like consent or intervening 
cause), or if the “particular issues” that the district court could 
certify “when appropriate” must be limited to questions that 
would resolve a defendant’s liability. 
At several points, Gates appears to suggest that the cer-
tified “issues” should (perhaps except in exceptional circum-
stances) be able to resolve a defendant’s liability. See, e.g., id. 
at 272 (“[T]he [district] court declined to certify a liability-only 
class.”); id. at 273 (“The trial court here did not abuse its dis-
cretion by declining to certify a liability-only issue class when 
it found liability inseverable from other issues that would be 
left for follow-up proceedings.”); id. (“Nor did the court err in 
finding no marked division between damages and liability.”); 
id. at 274 (“Plaintiffs have neither defined the scope of the lia-
bility-only trial nor proposed what common proof would be 
presented.”); id. (“A trial on whether the [issues proposed] is 
unlikely to substantially aid resolution of the substantial issues 
on liability and causation.”). 
Reading “issues” in Rule 23(c)(4) to exclude claim ele-
ments is supported by later cases from our Court. In Gonzalez 
v. Corning, 885 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2018), for example, the only 
published opinion from this Court to apply Gates, we reiterated 
that issue-class certification “might be appropriate” if “liability 
is capable of classwide treatment but damages are not[.]” Id. at 
202-03 (emphasis added). Said another way, issue-class certi-
fication is not appropriate if class-wide resolution of the “is-
sues” does not resolve liability. See id. (noting that declining 
issue-class certification was appropriate because plaintiffs of-
fered “no theories of liability for which classwide treatment is 
apt”) (emphasis added). 
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But at various other points, Gates suggests that claim 
elements may be appropriate for issue-class treatment in cer-
tain circumstances. For example, the Gates Court “agreed” 
with the district court’s finding that an issue class was not fea-
sible and would not advance the resolution of class members’ 
claims because “both the fact of damages and the amount of 
damages would remain following the class-wide determination 
of any common issues, and further that causation and extent of 
contamination would need to be determined at follow-up pro-
ceedings.” Gates, 655 F.3d at 272 (quoting district court). In 
other words, for the district court, the fact that claim elements 
(like causation) would remain after resolution of the class is-
sues was a reason for the inappropriateness of certifying an is-
sue class. But neither the district court nor the court of appeals 
concluded that claim elements remaining after resolution of 
class issues barred issue-class certification. 
Viewing Gates to permit the certification of issues that 
do not resolve liability comports with our pre-Gates caselaw. 
In Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2004), we noted 
“that courts commonly use Rule 23(c)(4) to certify some ele-
ments of liability for class determination, while leaving other 
elements to individual adjudication—or, perhaps more realis-
tically, settlement.” Id. at 267 (emphasis added). So there, we 
affirmed the district court’s certification of an issue class lim-
ited to determining the defendant’s course of conduct (whether 
a federal agency placed “thousands of Virgin Islanders, almost 
all of whom were Black, Hispanic, or female,” on a “phony, 
illegal waiting list” when those individuals sought to apply to 
a “loan program[] intended to help low income rural families 
obtain homes and make repairs to existing homes,” id. at 259-
60, 263), but left for subsequent individual adjudication the is-
sue of whether those individuals were eligible for the loans in 
the first place. Id. at 267. 
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Other courts of appeals have permitted the certification 
of non-liability issue classes in analogous circumstances. The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, has affirmed the certification of 
an issue class where the issues, once resolved, stopped short of 
establishing a defendant’s liability to any claimant. See, e.g., 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (in employment case, en-
dorsing the use of a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class to determine the 
disparate impact of a challenged corporate policy, with “sepa-
rate trials . . . to determine which class members were actually 
adversely affected . . . and if so what loss each class member 
sustained”); cf. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393-94 
(7th Cir. 2010) (in consumer fraud case, upholding certifica-
tion of Rule 23(b)(3) class when common issues left compo-
nents of causation for individualized determination). 
Moreover, the text of Rule 23(c)(4) supports the reading 
that the “issues” a district court may certify for class treatment 
need not be limited to those that decide a party’s liability. The 
Rule permits an action to be brought or maintained as a class 
action “with respect to particular issues,” not just those that de-
cide liability. We therefore hold that district courts may certify 
“particular issues” for class treatment even if those issues, once 
resolved, do not resolve a defendant’s liability, provided that 
such certification substantially facilitates the resolution of the 
civil dispute, preserves the parties’ procedural and substantive 
rights and responsibilities, and respects the constitutional and 
statutory rights of all class member and defendants.  
 
* * * * * 
 
In sum, district courts tasked with resolving motions to 
certify issue classes must make three determinations. First, 
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does the proposed issue class satisfy Rule 23(a)’s require-
ments? Second, does the proposed issue class fit within one of 
Rule 23(b)’s categories? Third, if the proposed issue class does 
both those things, is it “appropriate” to certify these issues as a 
class? Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). The first two steps will be in-
formed by general class-action doctrine. The third step will be 
informed by Gates. See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
574 F.3d 169, 201 (3d Cir. 2009). In other words, Rule 23(a) 
and Rule 23(b) decide if the proposed issues can be brought or 
maintained as class action, while the Gates factors determine 
whether they should.  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
Guided by Rule 23(c)(4) and Gates, in this case, we 
must determine whether the District Court appropriately certi-
fied for class treatment whether the Commission owed a rele-
vant legal duty to the Plaintiffs that it subsequently breached, 
but left for individual proceedings whether Plaintiffs were in-
jured; whether the Commission’s breach of the relevant duty 
actually and proximately caused those injuries; whether those 
injuries are due a particular amount of damages; and whether 
the Commission’s affirmative defenses (including, presuma-
bly, that each Plaintiff consented to medical treatment by Ig-
berase) can refute Plaintiffs’ claim. 
We review the District Court’s decision to certify the 
duty and breach issues of Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of 
emotion distress claim for abuse of discretion. Gates, 655 F.3d 
at 262. A district court abuses its discretion if its “decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (quoting 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
Whether the district court employed the correct legal standard 
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is reviewed de novo. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 471 F.3d at 312 
(citing In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32 
(2d Cir. 2006)). Conducting that review, we conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion.  
 
A. The District Court erred in certifying this issue 
class 
Two reasons, each independently sufficient, support the 
conclusion that the District Court misapplied Gates when it 
certified for class treatment the duty and breach elements of 
Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.  
First, the District Court did not determine whether the 
duty and breach elements of Plaintiffs’ claim satisfied Rule 
23(b)(3). The Court correctly observed that Gates does not re-
quire Plaintiffs seeking issue-class certification to prove that 
their cause of action as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3). J.A. 42-
43 (“[The Commission]’s argument that the Court should re-
quire Plaintiffs to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance re-
quirement before turning to these factors parrots one of the 
camps that the Third Circuit acknowledged but refused to join 
in Gates. Because the Third Circuit rejected that view, this 
Court must do the same.”); see also J.A. 56 (“Having deter-
mined that Plaintiffs can satisfy the Rule 23(a) factors, the 
Court turns to the question of whether to certify an issues class 
under Rule 23(c)(4).”). But while Gates does not require Plain-
tiffs seeking issue-class certification to prove that their cause 
of action as a whole satisfies a subsection of Rule 23(b), for 
reasons we have explained, Rule 23(c)(4) does require that the 
Plaintiffs demonstrate that the issues they seek to certify satisfy 
one of Rule 23(b)’s subsections. On remand, the Plaintiffs may 
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be able to make such a showing, but we will leave that inquiry 
to the District Court to consider in the first instance.4   
Second, separate and apart from the District Court’s 
failure to determine whether the duty and breach elements of 
Plaintiffs’ claim satisfied any subsection of Rule 23(b), the 
Court also failed to rigorously consider several Gates factors. 
 
4 The Commission also insists that the District Court erred in 
finding that Plaintiffs’ satisfied Rule 23(a)’s typicality and ad-
equacy requirements. Appellant Br. 18-19. It argues the Plain-
tiffs are atypical and inadequate class representatives because 
they propose to inflict emotional distress on absent class mem-
bers currently ignorant of the underlying allegations, and that 
Plaintiffs’ decision to seek relief only for their emotional dis-
tress makes them inadequate representatives of absent class 
members who have suffered physical injuries. Neither argu-
ment is persuasive. For one, we find no support for the propo-
sition that absent class members ignorant of their potential le-
gal injury might cause named plaintiffs (who are aware of their 
injury) to be inadequate or atypical class representatives. For 
another, if the District Court determines that some cognizable 
subset of absent class members may also have live legal claims 
for physical injuries, then it has ample tools at its disposal to 
manage those divergences, including by creating subclasses 
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(5) or the notice requirements of Rule 
23(c)(4).We have “set a low threshold for typicality.” In re 
Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 
F.3d 410, 428 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). And 
“[e]ven relatively pronounced factual differences will gener-
ally not preclude a finding of typicality where there is a strong 
similarity of legal theories or where the claim arises from the 
same practice or course of conduct.” Id. 
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For example, the Court does not explicitly discuss whether the 
effect certification of the issue class will have on the effective-
ness and fairness of resolution of remaining issues. Many other 
actors played a role in Igberase’s fraud, including the residency 
programs that admitted and trained him, the state medical 
boards that licensed him, the hospitals that gave him privileges, 
the specialty board that certified him, and the law enforcement 
officers (state and federal) who investigated him. If an issue-
class jury finds that the Commission owed Plaintiffs a legal 
duty that it subsequently breached, the Commission may face 
undue pressure to settle, even if their breach did not cause 
Plaintiffs’ harm.  
Relatedly, the District Court did not rigorously consider 
what efficiencies would be gained by resolution of the certified 
issues. To be sure, the District Court briefly discussed the effi-
ciencies of a single trial and broached other options with the 
parties.  J.A. 60-61. But more was needed. To prove their claim 
that the Commission negligently inflicted emotional distress, 
Plaintiffs will need to show (as with all causes of action arising 
under state tort law) duty, breach, cause, and harm. But the 
District Court certified an issue class with respect to the duty 
and breach elements only. So even if the District Court finds 
that the Commission owed a relevant legal duty to the Plaintiffs 
that it subsequently breached, each Plaintiff, in individual pro-
ceedings, will have to prove that they were injured; that the 
Commission’s breach of the relevant duty actually and proxi-
mately caused those injuries; that those injuries are due a par-
ticular amount of damages; and that the Commission’s affirm-
ative defenses (including, presumably, each Plaintiff’s consent 
to medical treatment by Igberase) are not decisive.  
The District Court may also wish to consider whether 
the duty and breach elements of Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction 
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of emotional distress claim are suitable for issue-class treat-
ment. Under Pennsylvania law, for example, to determine 
whether the Commission owed the Plaintiffs a relevant legal 
duty, the class jury will have to weigh several factors, includ-
ing the “foreseeability of the harm incurred.” Althaus ex rel. 
Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. 2000) (citations 
omitted). And once beyond the class trial, to determine and 
measure emotional damages, each individual jury will have to 
assess the degree of the Commission’s negligence as to each 
Plaintiff. See Spence v. Bd. of Educ. of the Christina Sch. Dist., 
806 F.2d 1198, 1202 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding no abuse of dis-
cretion where the District Court joined for trial the issues of 
liability and damages for emotional distress, explaining that 
“emotional distress damages must be evaluated in light of all 
the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct”). So 
the issue-class jury, like each individual jury, may need to con-
sider evidence regarding the harm the Commission allegedly 
caused. And each individual jury, like the issue-class jury, may 
need to consider evidence regarding the Commission’s overall 
conduct, which likely will include the nature of the legal duty 
it owed Plaintiffs (if any) and the extent to which it breached 
that duty. Gates disfavors this. See 655 F.3d at 273 (holding 
that “the risk subsequent triers of fact will need to reexamine 
evidence and findings from resolution of the common issue(s)” 
counsels against certification of those common issues).  
Of course, the District Court may very well be correct 
that “there are efficiencies to be gained by certifying a class on 
these issues because it will allow for a single trial with a single, 
preclusive determination about [the Commission]’s conduct, 
rather than the presentation of the same evidence about [the 
Commission] again, and again, and again to separate juries.” 
J.A. 60. Duty is an issue of law. Therefore, it must be decided 
separately from breach, causation, and damages. See Sharpe v. 
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St. Luke’s Hosp., 821 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa. 2003). It is true that 
deciding if the Commission had a duty to investigate requires 
balancing several factors. Id. But none of that requires individ-
ual evidence, for each patient shared the same distanced rela-
tionship of trust with the Commission. Likewise, breach would 
require only common evidence: How much investigating did 
the Commission do? Did it know or should it have known that 
Igberase was a fraud? Did it take enough steps to investigate 
him based on warnings received from various parties, includ-
ing the New Jersey residency program? Should it have fol-
lowed up in later years once Igberase was admitted to another 
residency program? No absent class member would have any-
thing special to add in her individual trial. There will be plenty 
left for individual proceedings, but these major issues could be 
resolved on a class-wide basis.5 
 
5 These two reasons are sufficient to support our decision to 
vacate the District Court’s certification for class treatment the 
duty and breach elements of Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim. But there may yet be other problems 
with the issue class, including the possibility that Plaintiffs’ le-
gal claim implicates multiple states’ laws. Under Gates, a dis-
trict court, tasked with resolving a motion to certify an issue 
class, must assess the “substantive law underlying the claim(s), 
including any choice-of-law questions [that law] may present.” 
655 F.3d at 273. Here, the District Court concluded that the 
various state laws that may be implicated do not meaningfully 
differ and that Pennsylvania law would govern anyway. Rus-
sell v. Educational Comm’n for Foreign Med. Graduates, 2020 
WL 1330699, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2020). That seems 
like a close question. It may well be true that Pennsylvania has 
the greatest interest in this case (the Commission’s alleged tor-
tious conduct occurred here, after all), but various other states 
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B. The Commission’s remaining arguments for re-
versal are unavailing or inapposite 
The Commission and its amicus offer two additional ba-
ses on which to reverse the District Court. The Commission 
first argues that “the plain text of Rule 23 and the cases inter-
preting it” demand that “the party seeking to certify a class 
must satisfy one of the prongs of Rule 23(b)” and, “[b]ecause 
the district court failed to find that Named Plaintiffs satisfied 
Rule 23(b)(3) or any other prong of Rule 23(b), the class certi-
fication must be reversed.” Appellant’s Br. 39; see also Brief 
for U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellant 5-16.  
That is not accurate. A majority of the courts of appeals 
have concluded that in appropriate cases Rule 23(c)(4) can be 
used even though full Rule 23(b)(3) certification is not possible 
due to the predominance infirmities. That view, the so-called 
“broad view,” has been adopted or supported by the Second, 
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.6 Under the broad 
 
have a substantial interest in the resolution of the claims, too. 
But because the conflict-of-law question was briefed before the 
District Court in the context of a motion for class certification, 
we will leave it to the District Court to determine which state’s 
law applies to each Plaintiff’s claim, if the question of which 
state’s law applies becomes relevant in future proceedings.  
6 For discussions of the broad view from these courts of ap-
peals, see, In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 
227 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting issue certification “regardless 
of whether the claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s pre-
dominance requirement’’); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 
348 F.3d 417,  439-45 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that courts may 
employ Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a class as to one claim even 
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view, courts apply the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and supe-
riority prongs after common issues have been identified for 
class treatment under Rule 23(c)(4). The broad view permits 
 
though all of the plaintiffs’ claims, taken together, do not sat-
isfy the predominance requirement); Martin v. Behr Dayton 
Thermal Prods., 896 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that 
“Rule 23(c)(4) contemplates using issue certification . . . where 
common questions predominate within certain issues and 
where class treatment of those issues is the superior method of 
resolution”); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 23(c)(4) 
provides that ‘when appropriate, an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.’ 
The practices challenged in this case present a pair of issues 
that can most efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis, 
consistent with the rule just quoted.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 559 
(7th Cir.), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, (7th 
Cir. Aug. 3, 2016); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 
(7th Cir. 2010) (“A district court has the discretion to split a 
case by certifying a class for some issues, but not others, or by 
certifying a class for liability alone where damages or causa-
tion may require individualized assessments.”); Valentino v. 
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“Even if the common questions do not predominate over the 
individual questions so that class certification of the entire ac-
tion is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in ap-
propriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 
23(c)(4)[] and proceed with class treatment of these particular 
issues.”).   
 
30 
utilizing Rule 23(c)(4) even where predominance has not been 
(or cannot be) satisfied for the cause of action as a whole. 
The Fifth Circuit, however, in a footnote adopted what 
is known as “the narrow view,” which prohibits issue-class cer-
tification if Rule 23(b)(3) predominance has not been satisfied 
for the cause of action as a whole. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“A district court cannot 
manufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivi-
sion (c)(4). The proper interpretation of the interaction between 
subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a 
whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) 
and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever 
the common issues for a class trial.”). But Castano’s approach 
has not been adopted by any other circuit, and subsequent 
caselaw from the Fifth Circuit suggests that any potency the 
narrow view once held has dwindled. See Steering Comm. v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that bifurcation might serve “as a remedy for the obstacles pre-
venting a finding of predominance” but that the plaintiffs had 
not made such a proposal to the district court).7 
 
7 Further, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules appears to 
agree that issues can be certified for class treatment even if pre-
dominance cannot be satisfied for the action as a whole. At 
their April 2015 meeting, the Committee noted that “[a] major 
reason for considering possible rule amendments to deal with 
issue classes is that there has seemed to be a split in the circuits 
about whether they can only be allowed if (b)(3) predominance 
is established.” See Rule 23 Subcommittee Report, in Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules 243-99 (Apr. 9-10, 2015). But the 
Committee went on to note that “recent reports suggest that all 
the circuits are coming into relative agreement that in appro-
priate cases Rule 23(c)(4) can be used even though full Rule 
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The Commission’s attempts to avoid the majority view 
by arguing not so much that full-class Rule 23(b)(3) certifica-
tion must precede Rule 23(c)(4) certification, but that the Dis-
trict Court here failed to consider Rule 23(b)(3) at all. But “cer-
tifying a Rule 23(c)(4) class is analytically independent from 
the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3),” though pre-
dominance concerns may be relevant to both. See Gonzalez v. 
Corning, 885 F.3d 186, 202 (3d Cir. 2018) (“While Plaintiffs 
are correct to point out that the appropriateness of certifying a 
Rule 23(c)(4) class is analytically independent from the pre-
dominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3), a case may present 
concerns relevant to both.”).  
Amicus Chamber of Commerce offers yet another rea-
son to reverse the District Court: that the District Court’s Rule 
23(c)(4) ruling, if adopted, “will permit a flood of abusive class 
actions, with troubling and far-reaching consequences for busi-
nesses, shareholders, employees, customers, and the judicial 
system.” Brief for U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Appellant 16-18. The Chamber’s concerns 
seem overblown. Even capacious rules for issue-class certifi-
cation (which we do not purport to advance in this holding) 
likely will not encourage “a flood of abusive class actions” be-
cause few lawyers will have an incentive to file them. Any lu-
crative potential payday for class action lawyers arises from 
securing a damages award, not from obtaining an order on a 
particular issue. That order, which can be thought of as a type 
of declaratory judgment, may eventually transform into a judg-
ment awarding damages, but even then it is not clear that the 
future individualized proceedings would be controlled by the 
 
23(b)(3) certification is not possible due to the predominance 
requirement.” Id. at 280 (emphasis added). 
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lawyers that won the issue-class order. In any case, even if a 
lawyer could obtain a quasi-declaratory ruling on a subset of 
common issues, the transformation of the case from a proposed 
class action to a set of individualized proceedings would spoil 
any settlement leverage that the lawyer had. Of course, the law-
yer representing the class would prefer a favorable issue-class 
order to no order at all, but the defendant, once facing just in-
dividualized proceedings, could return to the very tactics that 
may have given it an advantage in the first place. From the de-
fense perspective, such tactics could have the added benefit of 
deterring other class-action lawyers from attempting similar bi-
furcated class actions in the future. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Because the District Court failed to determine whether 
the proposed issues satisfied a subsection of Rule 23(b), and 
because it failed to rigorously analyze several Gates factors, 
we will vacate the District Court’s issue-class certification and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we vacate the District Court’s Order 
certifying for aggregate treatment the duty and breach elements 
of Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. 
